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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS		✓		
5	DDI		✓		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL				
16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	NIC/SP		✓		
21	C/AcIS		✓		
22					

SUSPENSE _____ Date

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary

3/5/84
Date

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Executive Registry
84- 1100

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

February 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ASAT IG MEMBERS

SUBJECT: ASAT Work Plan and Interim Guidance

The National Security Advisor has approved our Work Plan and the Interim Guidance as indicated in Attachment 1. Also attached are Talking Points and Questions and Answers that have been coordinated by the Working Group. Request that you provide this information to all the appropriate spokesmen in your organization who may have to deal with ASAT matters.

I believe that everything is now on track, but we will have to work very hard to stay with our ambitious schedule. I will be consulting with you shortly about more specifics on our plan for interacting with Capitol Hill.

Henry F. Cooper

Atchs
As stated

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INTERIM SPACE ARMS CONTROL POLICY GUIDANCE

US arms control policy must serve our fundamental national security objectives and cannot be an end in itself. Arms control arrangements for outer space are desirable if they contribute to achieving our national security objectives.

The US National Space Policy, announced by the President July 4, 1982, states the following:

> "The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security."

This remains the policy of the Administration. The Administration will continue to study a comprehensive ban on anti-satellite weapons as well as a range of possible options for other forms of space arms control. This study has been undertaken with a view toward negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nations, if compatible with our national security interests.

The difficulties which attend a comprehensive ban, and therefore, negotiations on such a ban, are formidable. A ban must be verifiable and compatible with national security. No satisfactory way has yet been found, by this or previous Administrations, to verify effectively Soviet compliance with a comprehensive ban which would be in our national security interests. There is also the related problem of break-out -- the risk that one nation could gain a unilateral advantage by suddenly abrogating a ban and obtaining a head start in building or deploying anti-satellite weapons. (This problem is of particular concern in view of the fact that the Soviets possess proven technology which they could use to reconstitute rapidly an ASAT capability.) Further, a number of non-ASAT weapons have a residual capability to damage space objects. Also, there are complex definitional problems, including the difficulty of defining what constitutes a space weapon. And finally, consistent with established national security policy, the US must be able to deter threats to space systems of the US and its allies, and be able to counter space-based systems designed to support hostile terrestrial forces.

The above problems do not preclude forms of space arms control which are judged to be in the overall interest of the US and its allies. The US is examining a range of arms control options, as well as various space confidence-building measures, to determine whether any might serve our national security.

While we will not minimize the difficulties associated with such measures, we will continue energetically to study them to determine whether any are consistent with the requirements of US national security.

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Points to Stress on Space Arms Control

1. Area of great interest.

2. Some limitations on space weapons already:

- UN Charter ban on use of force except in self defense applies to space.

- Outer Space Treaty bans nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from space.

- Limited Test Ban Treaty bans nuclear weapons tests in outer space.

- ABM Treaty bans development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems or components.

3. International Treatment of Issue:

- 1978-79 bilateral US-USSR negotiations: Sides were separated on several issues including verification problems; negotiations were not resumed following Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

- US supports current CD discussions to sort out space arms control issues.

4. Difficult problems blocking negotiations now:

- Soviets have ASAT interceptor operational since 1971; US interceptor only under development.

- Hard to verify compliance with many aspects of ASAT limitations (e.g., elimination of Soviet interceptor).

- Break-out could be rapid.

- Non-ASAT weapons (e.g., certain ABM interceptors) could be used against satellites.

- Non-weapon Soviet satellites pose threat to US and Allied forces in aiding Soviet targetting of these forces.

5. US Policy

- US will consider verifiable and equitable space arms control measures consistent with US security.

- US cannot, while above problems under study, enter into negotiations on space arms control.

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